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mAPTER I

.

INTROOOCl'ION
In

Jul3, 1968 a Federal Reserve System Committee. which had been

established to reappraise and

where~

necessary recommend rede&ign of

Federal Reserve lending facilities, made its report. l

The Committee

stated that the objective of its propos&ls was to reduce instability in
financial markets, which is. caused bY' short-run adjustments in bank
pr1mar.r reserve positions, without hampering overall monetar,y control.
These are really two separate and not

necessar~

2

compatible objectives.

One is to relieve stress in the financial markets bY' facilitating primary
reserve adjustments.

The other is to improve control over the suPPlr

of reserves to the banking system.
The purpose of this paper is to consider how well these two obe
jectives might be met i f the Committee's propos&ls are adopted.

It

is assumed that the basis for decisions at commercial banks is maximicat
ion ot profits in the long run.

IIlReappraisal of the Fed~ral Reserve Discount Mechanism: Report
ot a System Committee," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, July, 1968 (hereafter referred to as Committee Report). Reprint
ed in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, July, 1968, p. 545.

_

2 Ibid•• p. 1.

2

'lhe ColIIDIittee proposals can be ouWned as tollows:
Proposal

Present system

1.

Level of the Discount rate.
Set by each Reserve bank: with
the approval of the Board of
Governors. The level of the
rate is part ot the Fedaover...
an policy.

No change.

2.

Administration ot the: discount
v:lndow.
Each Reserve Bank controls the
borrowinga of the member banks.
in its district based on the
prinCiples set forth in Regu.
lation A. i.e. "continuous use
ot Federal Reserve credit is not
considered appropriate". The
appropriate uses of credit ~e:
a. unexpected temporar,y need
tor funds.
b. seasonal needs which cannot
be met by the banks own re
sources.
c. emergena,v needs.

De-tines more specifically
the credit available to
individual banks:
a. short-term adjustment
credit.
(1.) basic borrowing
priviledge. Sets
quantity limits on
the frequency. dur
ation and amount a
bank: can borrow from
the Reserve Bank
with no questions
asked.
(2. )

b.

c.

other adjustment
credit. Credit
beyond (1.) which
is subject to ad
ministrative action
by the Reserve Bank.
seasonal borrowing priv1ledge.
In addition to a.. a bank
that can demonstrate a
seasonal outflow of funds
can quality to borrow the
amount of the seasonal out
flow that is greater than
1~ of average deposits.
no change in emergency
lending to member banks.

The details of the Committee' a proposals are discussed ruther in
Chapter V.
tis paper is organized as follows:

Qlapter II examines in greater

detail the two objectives of discount reform.

Olapters

m

and IV propose

:3
• theoretical tramework tor analyzing the waT in which Federal Reserve
lending to banks can attect the tinancial markets and the
primar,v reserves to the banking sTstem.
8Upp~

.

supp~

ot

Chapter V develops an aggregate

function ot primary reserves at the discount window based on the

recommendations in the Committee Report. and & protit maximizing demand
function tor borrowed reserves.

In Chapter VI. the behavior ot borrowed

reserves during the primary reserve adjustment process is examined to
determine its possible ettects on money market rate stability and on
the

supp~

ot primarT reserves to the banking system.

vn summarizes the results ot the inqu1ry'.

F'irial.ly'. Chapter

"

CHAPTER II
THE OBJECTIVES OF DISCOUNT REFORM

The two objectives of discount reform are proximate objectives
of monetary policy.

That is, by promoting them it is believed the

ultimate goals of full-employment, price stability, economic growth
and extermal balance can be more readil3' achieved.

Why stability in

tinancial markets and the suPPl3' or reserves to the banking system
should be used as proximate objectives of Federal Reserve discount
policy is another question and one which remains outside the scope of
this paper.

The purpose here is to determine onl3' the extent to which

central bank lending under the new proposals will achieve the stated
objectives.
The teras used to describe the objectives need precise definition.
The tirst objective, as stated in the Committee Report, is to "lessen
80me

of the causes (i.e., short-term adjustment in bank reserve positions)

ot instability in the financial markets".

To paraphrase the Committee's

language, the objective is to lessen instability in the financial markets
which is caused b,y short-term adjustments in primar,y reserve positions
or banks.

Instability in the financial markets is signified b,y the

frequency of changes in direction in rates and b,y the size of rate
aovements per unit time.

ot unstable market rates.

No attempt will be made to quantify a condition
For the purpose here, instability will in

crease when the frequency or directional changes increase and when the
size or the rate movements in either direction increase per unit of time.

s
The financial markets affected bT bank behavior can be separated

into two categories based on the two broad types ot earning assets
held bT banks -

monetary assets and default risk assets.

Monetary

a,sets are short-term, readily marketable.· fixed in money value and
tree ot default risk.

The earning monetary assets which banks hold

include short-term Treasur,y securities, Federal funds sold. commercial
paper. acceptances, loans to U. S. Government securities dealers. and
negotiable certificates of deposits purchased) Non-earning monetarT
assets are primar,y reserves.
As the term implies, default risk assets have the characteristics

ot credit risk and are subject to varying degrees ot marketability
ranging, at best, trom that ot earning monetary assets, to those having
no marketability at all.

Default risk assets include loans and longer

term securities.
The market in which monetary assets are traded will. be called the
lIoney market, and it is here that banks make short-term primary reserve
adjustments.

More generally, the money market is where large wealth

holders with temporary excess liquidit.y can employ their cash funds

in earning assets for short periods of time at little or no risk of
default, and where large wealth-holders with temporary cash deficiencies
can obtain funds tor short periods ot time. 4 The principle credit

instruments in this market were mentioned above when describing the
earning Ilonetar,y. assets of banks.

:3 Roland I. Robinson, Money
McGraw-Hill, 1964) t p. 96.

4 Ibid.

The two most important tor reserve

~ Capital Markets (New York:

6
adjustment are TreaSU17 Bills and Federal f'unds.
The markets in which default risk assets are issued and traded
will be called the credit market.

The principle feature which distin

guishes this market from the money market i8 the existence of default
risk and use of the assets in this market mainly for income and capital
gains objectives rather than liquidity objectives.
The financial market to be considered for observing the extent
of instability in rate movements caused b.y primary reserve adjustment
will be the money market as described above.

The justification for

singling out this market and the problems raised b.y doing so are
discussed below in Chapter IV.
Short-term as used here means intra-reserve period, intra-month.q'
and seasonal time periods.

The reserve position of a bank is the re

lation of its actual holdings of primary reserves to its desired holdings.
Primary reserves are deposits at the Federal Reserve banks and vault
currency and coin.

The distinguishing feature is that no rate of return

is earned on these assets, and they can be used to fulfill legal reserve
requirements.

Adjustment is the process by which banks change their

actual primary reserves to their desired holdings.
As stated above, the second objective of discount reform is to

inprove the central banks control over the amount of reserves supplied
to the banking system.
this goal.

The Committee Report is not explicit in stating

It wants to lessen money market instability l'without hampering

overall monetary controlII (p. 1).

Monetary control is control of the

5 The reserve period is now one week tor all banks.
time periods vary in length from one to six months.

Seasonal

7
stock of money and is employed by the central bank in its attempt to
achieve the objectives of general economic policy. 6 There are three
factors which jointly determine the stock of money:
1.

Tbe stock of primar,y reserve assets in the monetar,y s,ystem.

2.

The publics preference toward holding IlOney in the form of
deposits or currency.

,.

The ratio between primar,y reserves and deposits maintained
by the banking s,ystem.?

At best the central bank has direct control over number one.

Given

the relationships in two and three, the central bank will improve its
control over the money stock by improving its control over the stock
of primary reserve assets in the monetary system.

This paper will

use control over the stock of banking system primary reserves as a
pr~

of monetar,y control and as the second major objective of discount

reform.

The details of the reserve supply process are given below.

6 Harry G. Johnson, "Monetary Theor,y & Policy", American Economic
Review (June, 19(2), p. 335.
? Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, A Moneta!y History of the
United states 1867-1960 (Princeton University Press), 1963, p. ,50.

QlAPTER nI
THE SUPPLY OF PRIMARY RESERVES TO THE BANKING SYSTEM

..
The following is proposed as a framework for
of oentral bank lending on monetar,r control.

ana~zing

the effect

It will be used to examine

the conditions under which me.ber-bank borrowing can improve or diminish
the central bank's control over the amount of primar.y reserves supplied
to the banking system.
Currency and coin, and deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks are
the only two assets that quality as primary reserves.

The faotors which

determine their supply are:
1.

U. S. Government Securities and Acceptances held by the
Federal Reserve Banks (S).

2.

Federal Reserve Float (F). This is the total amount of
credit given to one member bank (p~ee) without a corres.
ponding charge to another bank (payor) during the check
clearing process.

).

Fedeaal Reserve Bank discounts and advances to member banks

4.

Gold stock (GS).

5.

treasury Currency outstanding (Tc ).

(B).

Not all reserve funds supplied b,y the above factors are avail
able to the banking s.ystem as primary reserves.

Non-banking-system

8 The first three items are called Federal Reserve Bank Credit
outstanding. The accounts supplying and using reserve funds are shown
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin table: "Member Bank Reserves. Federal
Reserve Bank Credit and Related Items."

9
uses of reserve funds are:
1.

Currency and coin held by the public (Cp ).

2.

Currency and coin held by the Treasllr)' (ct).

J.

Treasury deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Dt).

4.

Foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Dr).

5.

other deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (Do).

6.

other Federal Reserve Bank accounts net (OA). This consists
of capital accounts and the net value of minor accounts.

The differency between total reserve funds supplied, and non
banking-system uses is the stock of primary reserves available to the
banking system (Rs):
Rs= (S + F + B + GS i: Tc) - (Cp +

<;,

+

Dt

+

Dr

+ Do + OA).

(1)

Some of the terms in (1) usually have small week-to-week changes and,
consequently, are of minor importance in determining week-to-week changes
in Rs.

These are Ct , Df , Do and OA in the non-banking-system uses of

reserve funds, and Tc and GS in the factors supplying reserve funds. 9
Of all the variables determining Rs ~ only S is completely con
trolled by the central bank.

B is

joint~

determined by central bank

supply conditions and the member bank demand function for borrowing,
both of which are discussed later.

The remaining variables are deter

mined by a variety of market forces and institutional practices, and

9 Of the non-banking-system uses of reserve funds. c;, is by
far the most important in its total amount. I).uoing July, 1968, Cn
averages 95'1> of total non-banking-system uses of reserve funds. In
the same period, U. S. Government securities accounted for 73'1> of
the total factors supplying reserve funds. This proportion has been
increasing since the beginning of the Federal Reserve system.

10
are outside of the centralb~ direct control. 10

For example, GS

is determined by the relative co_odity prices ed rates of return in
the United states and other coUntries.

Cp

is determined by the public's

preferency to hold currenc.y rather than bank deposits.

F is determined

by the size of deposit tlovs among banks that make clearing settlements
through the Federal Reserve Banks. . The determinants of Rs which are
not under the central bank's direct control will be referred to as
market determined variables.

In order to emphasize the distinction

between market determined variables and controlled variables, equation
(1) is abbreviated. by combining the variable whose week-to-week change

are relatively minor

(~, D , Do' OAt GS and Tc) into 0, and by grouping

f
it in brackets with the other variables that are not directly controlled

by the central bank:
Rs

=S+

0= GS

B + (F + 0 -

c., !'. Dt)

(2)

en

+ Tc - ct - Df - Do - OA

The volUJDe of primary reserves available to the banldng system is
determined by Federal Reserve holdings of Securities, Sf which is
directly controlled by the central bank; by the size of member bank

--

borrowing; and by four market determined variables which are not dir
ectly controlled by the central bank.

Equation (2) can be further

abbreviated to combine the four market determined variables into one
term. I. for the purpose of showing how B ilnproves or diminishes the
10 The ce~tral bank can indirectly influence such variables as
G, Cp, and Dr via its influence on market rates of return. Float (F)
is directly determined by Fed to the extent that Fed sets the time
lag for crediting checks cleared through it. But once these terms
are set. the amount of F is out of the central bank's direct control.

11

oentral bank's control over Rs:
Rs

I:

(4)

t (St Bt X)

The conditions under which B will improve central bank control
over Rs can be stated trom (4).

It will increase the central bank t IS

control over Rs if it behaves in a pattern 'b offset changes in the .
uncontrolled and market determined variables summarized in I.

B

diminishes central bank control over Rs if its behavior oftsets
changes in the controlled variable, S.
aonetar,y control it it does neither.

B. has a neutral eftect on

In other words, for B to improve

central bank control over Rs ' it wst behave in a manner that would
counter unwanted changes in
in X.

Its

caused by the market determined variables

Since the central bank's innuence over Rs is derived from its

control over S, changes in S are a
respect to Rs.

pr~

for central bank policy with

If B behaves in a manner to otfset the policy changes

in S, it is reducing central bank control over Rs.

As Meigs has stated,

liThe central bank may not have effective control over of total reserves,
in the American

s,yste~,

because the banks

~

oftset open-market oper

ations with changes in the volume of their borrowings.n 11
The manner in 'Which B. is likely to behave can be established by
examining the banking system demand function for B and the supply con
ditions tor B as proposed in the Committee Report.

This is done after

the primar,y reserve adjustment process is forJlnllated •

. 11 A.. James Meigs, .!!!!. Reserves .!:!!!! ~ Money: SUppl,y (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. JO.

CRAPl'ER

rv

THE PRIMARY RESERVE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS

The problem of this section is to develop a theor,y of the banking
system primar,y reserve adjustment process which can be used to analyze
its effect on the money markets.

Specif1~,

it will be used later

to show how this adjustment process oan be destabilizing with respect
to the rates of return on reserve adjustment instruments.

In order to

focus on primar,y reserve management, many of the interesting details
of the monetary system have been left out.

After the adjustment process

is presented, some of these simpl1tications will be discussed.
Primary reserve adjustment is a process central to money
theor,y.

supp~

The traditional textbook monetary multiplier is based on a

demand for primary reserves which is

exact~

equal to the

leg~

required

amount. 12 That is the demand for excess re~erves is alwqs zero.

In

equilibrium (i.e., no change in deposits and earning assets of the
banking system) actual reserves equal required reserves--required

reserves being the same as desired reserves:
rD

=R

r

= legal reserve

D

=total deposits

R

= actual

ratio

stock of primary reserves available to the banking

system.

Since excess reserves are assumed to be zero, an

exogeneous~

determined

12 ~ster V. Chandler. !h! F..con0m!cs .2!. Money ~ Banking, 4th ed.
Harper and Row, 1964). Chapter 5.

~

....

l'
R yallds a given D, and earning assets are known by the balance sheet
constraint L = D - R (L:; earning assets).
'!he central bank directs changes in the money stock (D) by setting
the reserve adjustment process in motion.
reduces R so that rD

I:

R.

That is, it increases or it

It actual reserves are made greater than

required (desired) reserves, the individual. banks w1ll try to reduce
this holding of R by buying earning assets (L).

But, such action

passes the unwanted reserves onto another bank and for the banking
8,fstem as a whole, actual. reserves cannot be reduced.

So. the reserve

adjustment process continues until required reserves have risen to
equal the actual reserves.
agaib.

Here the banking system is in equilibrium

Adjustment continues until:

r,o,D :;OR
The change in desired reserves (r 4 D) equal.s the change in actual. re
serves (A R).

The relation between the A R and A D is the multiplier

l/r:
AD

= l/r AR.

More recent work in money supply theory has attempted to explain vari
ations of desired reserve from required reserves and, in so doing, has
applied the modern theories of the demand for money and other financial
assets to commercial. bank behavior. 1,

l'

This work and the above basic

cf., Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer, "Some FUrther Investigation
of the Demand and SUpply Function for Money," Journal !!1. Finance (May',
1964), p. 240; Frank deleeuw, I~ Model of Financial Behavior. II The
Brookings Quarterq Economic Model .2!!h! u. S•• edited by James Duesen
berry (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company,l9b5). p. 512; W.G. Dewald,
!'Free Reserves. Total Reserves and Monetary Control, II Journal of
Political EconoD\Y (April, 1963), p. 141.

14
outline of the monetary process provide the point of departure for the
following formulation of the primar,y reserve adjustment process.
I.

THE DFlUND FOR EX:CESS RESERVES

The theory of primar,y reserve adjustment proceeds from assumptions
regarding. the behavior of individual banks.

A simplified balance sheet

of a single bank is:
RR + ER + ~ + E2
ER + RR

= TD

=TR

RR

=required reserves.

Eft

= excess reserves

It

=earning assets of the type traded in the money markets.

Ez

= earning assets

TD

=total deposits subject to reserve requirements.

TR

=depos:1ts at

(in th.e legal sense).

of the type traded in the credit marlcet"Se

FRB and vault cash (primary reserves).

Some asset and liability accounts (e.g., bank premises and capital
accounts) are lett out on the grounds that they do not intluence the
reserve adjustment decisions facing the bank.

Required reserves (RR)

are set b,y the legal reserve rat:1o and the volume of deposits subject
14
to that ratio.
Earning assets, it and ~, are both alternatives to
14 Since September, 1968, there haw been significant changes in
the computation of required reserves. They are: (1) Placing all banks
on a one-week reserve period. (2) Using average deposits two weeks
earlier as the base for week~ average required reserves for the current
week,
Count:1ng vault cash held two weeks earlier and balances at
Fed. in the current week as the current week's legal reserves held, and
(4) Permitting banks to carry forward to the next reserve period exces8
reserves or deficiencies up to 2$; ot required reserve changer. Nos. 2
and 3 are the most important for primary reser"e management. Banks
now know what their required reserves are at the beginning of the reserve
per:1od, and they know the portion of RR met by vault cash.

cn

15
holding ER.

The asset

Ez

is what has

previous~

been called a default

risk asset, and the market in which E2 is issued and traded is called
the credit market.

The asset,

Et

plays the role of secondary reserves

and is a monetary asset which. by previous definition, has no risk of
detault and is traded in the money market.

In considering the effects of short-run primar,y reserve adjustment
on rates in financial markets. the most frequently used alternative

to ER is assumed to

be

Fi.'

an asset which differs from ER onl,y- in having

a variable market yield. and an asset which is traded in the money

Jllarket.

In other words. the problem is confined to that of choosing

between ER on the one hand, and
etary assets.

E:1

on the other. both of whicb. are mon

The choice that determines the relative amount of wealth

. allocated to monetary assets. F1. + TR, and to default risk assets.

E.2.

is abstracted in this discussion. 15

Shifts in the relative amount

ot monetary assets and credit market assets held
ta1nly affect rates in the tWo markets.

•

by banks would cer

BIrt. it is assumed that

such shifts take place over longer periods of time than the period
considered here.

Short-term adjustment in primary reserves is the

employing ot "surplus" primary reserve funds for short periods ot time
by purchasing assets

close~

substitutable tor primar,y reserves, namely,

15 George Morrison suggests that the bank's demand tor non-earning
assets should be approached from the general context of the demand
and supp~ tor each of the principle asset categories in a bankts port
folio. George Morrison, !h! Liguidity .~efe:r:ence .2! £ommercial Banks
(Chicago: University of Cldcago Press, 1966J. p. 13. For an optim
ization model of individual bank portfolio selection, see Willi6Jll
Russell, "Commercial Bank Porttolio Adjustment. n American Economic
Review (May. 1964), p. 544.

16
earning monetar,y assets.

Thus, short-tera adjustment to temporar,y

"surplus" reserves affect the money market.

The reasoning is the same

for a temporary deficient primary reserve position.

Therefore, the

market in which short-term primary reserve adjustment has its main
effect is assumed to be the money market.

This affords a well defined

market for observing the effects of primar.y reserve adjustment.
TD includes demand deposits, savings deposits, and other time
deposits net of cash items in process of collection.
The basic assumption with regard to bank behavior is that the
individual bank will at all times want to maintain some given amount
of excess reserves.

The desired volume of excess reserves is denoted

Ea., and the barlk's objective in deciding on ER* is to minimize its
loss from holding excess reserves.

Based on. this objactive, there are

two main arguments in the function which describes ER••
The first is the opportunity cost. OC. of holding ER.
expected return that could be gotten by holding
OC is, in turn, determined by two factors.
on El, r, which is known with certainty.

E1

This is

rather than ER.

One is the rate of return

As mentioned above, the

asset, El, which is the alternative of holding

F~,

is assumed to be

payable in a fixed amount at maturity and have no risk of default.
Thus, r could be represented by the current yield to maturity on short
term secondary reserve assets.
The other

~eterm1nant

g, due to a change in r.
cise~

of OC is the expected capital gain or loss,
The variable, g, can be described more pre

with a probability distribution whose mean is Mg and whose stand

ard deviation is Sg_

Assuming banks on the average expect no change in r.

17

Mg

II:

0, and Sg remains as a measure ot risk ot capital gain or loss.

Th. larger Sg. the larger the risk associated with any given r.

It

BlOat banks are risk averters16 • tor a given r, a rise in Sg will lower
the expected return to be obtained from investment in

Et.

inverse relationship between OC and Sg can be postulated.
shown later in the paper.

Thus, an
As will be

Sg can become an important destabilizing

torce on OC and, thus, on ER* it money market rat.s fluctuate to a
large extent.

This is because rat. movements in the money market

1nfiuence Sg.

In contrast to Sg. which is a variable describing expected risk

Mg

ot capital gain or loss.
expected capital loss.

is a measure of either expected gain or

The more positive

. expected gain and the higher is.

oc..

Mg is. the bigher is the

The more, neg.at1v.a" rig is, the higher'

is the expected capital loss and the lover is OC.

There is a direct

relationship between Mg and OC.
To summarize the determinats ot OC, the following relationship
can be used:
~

=F

Cr. Kg. Sg)

~.r+Mg-Sg

(5)
(6)

16 Professor Tobin defines a risk avener as one who n ••• will
not be satisf'i'e.d to accept more risk unless they can also expect
greater expected return." They are in contrast to the risk lovers
who " ••• are willing to accept lower expected return in order to have
the chance ot unusually high capital gains••• 11 James Tobin, ilLiquidity
Preterence as Behavior Towards Risk." Review of Economic studies
(February. 1958). p. 73. As a group. banks are-more likely to be
risk-averters. partly because ot the liquidity of their liabilities
compared to their assets. and partly because of the complex of laws
and governmental authority restraining their activities and shaping
their attitud.s.
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In (6). the signs are used to show the direction or the relationship.

The subscript i denotes that this is a function tor an individual bank.
The other major argument in the function explaining Ea. is the
expected cost of a reserve drain that results in a reserve deficiency
(ER le8s than 0).
Id..na:nts.

This will be denoted ECD.

It also has two deter

The first is the penalty cost17 n, per dollar of reserve

deticienq.

This is usually known in advance with certainty.18 The

actual size of n depends on how the deticienc.y is covered.

Here it

is usetu1 to distinguish two methods ot adjustment-borrowing from the
Federal Reserve Banks and the use of an adjustment instrument whose
rate is determined in the money market.

The latter method would in

clude the sale of short-term U. S. Government securities and the purchase
of Federal funds.

If n is a market determined rate, its valu. at the

beginning of a reserve period would not be known with as much certainty
a8 if the appropriate n were the discount rate.
to be met by selling (reducing)

Et,

It the deficiency is

n would be the yield on El plus

the capital gain or loss trom selling

F1..

The yield on

Et

would be

known with certainty, but the capital gain or loss would not be known
for sure until the asset is sold.

It the deficiency is met by purchas

ing Federal funds, the penalty rate would be the rate paid on Federal

hnd. and would not hi known with certainty.

In other words. the value

of n i8 more uncertain it the method of adjustment has a market deter
mined rate rather than an administered rate.

OPe

In a later section all

17 The term penalty cost is used in this context by Morrison,
cit•• p. 9.

18 As long as the bank knows it can cover the deficienc,y by borrow
ing trom the Federal Reserve and is willing to do so, it would be certain
that at most n would equal the discount rate.
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_thods ot adjustment with a market determined rate are grouped into a
single alternative to borrowing trom the Federal Reserve Bank.19
The other determinant of ECD is expectations regarding a reserve
drain greater than ER.
can be specified using a

This will be denoted by f.
probabil1~

The variable t

distribution ot expected reserve

flows with a mean of Nt and a standard deviation of St.

It

Mt

=0

reserve rlows on average are not expected to change ER, but that this
will in fact happen is more risky the greater Sr.

Thus. Sf becomes

a measurement ot uncertainty about future reserve flows.

The greater

the uncertainty about reserve flow, the greater the unexpected cost ot
reserve deticienc,y_
When

Mf

The relationship between

st

is positive, the bank on average expects a reserve inflow.

When Nt is negative, a reserve loss is expected.
between

Nt

and ECD is direot.

and

ECD is an inverse one.

ot Mt. the lower

The relationship

The higher the arithmetic value

ECD and vice versa.

To summarize the determinants ot ECD, the tollowing relationship
can be written:

ECD

=G (n, Mr'

St)

ECD=n+Sr-Ht

(7)
(8)

In (8), the signs indicate the direction of the relationship.

19 This discussion has not included the administrative or
transaction costs ot meeting a reserve deficiene.y. It is assumed here
that they are constant over time and. theretore , are not responsible
tor any change in n. For an example ot including administrative costs
in a reserve adjustment model, see D. Orr and W. Mellon, "stochastic
Reserve Losses and EXpansion of Bank Credit," American F.eonomic Review
(September. 1961), p. 614.
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The above two arguments make up the demand function tor excess
reNrves as tollows:

ERt = lit

ERr = ECDi
(~

ER! •

(9)

(ECD.1.. OCi )
-

-

ex;.

(10)
(11)

Sti - Hri) - (ri  \ i - Sgi)

'lbe signs in (10) and (11) show the direction ot the relationship.
The demand tor excess reserves qy the entire banking s,yste. is the sum

ot the excess reserves demand for each individual

bank and will be shown

as:
EIl* • H (ECD. OC)

(12)

Ell· = ECD - OC

(13)

Mf) -

ER* = (n - St -

(r - ~ - Sg)

Ea*

= Desired..holding"s,ot

BCD

= Expected

(14)

exc&S8 reeM"V'tt&.

cost ot a reserve dericienc,y.

n:= Penalty cost per dollar

ot reserve deticienc,y.

Kr •

Mean ot expectations about volume ot reserve flows.

Sf

standard deviation of expectations about volume ot
reserve now.

IF

OC = Cpportuntty cost ot holding excess reserves.

r

=Rate ot return on earning assets.

Kg = Average ot expectations about changes in r.
Sg

= standard

deviation of expectations regarding changes

in r.
The sign in the ER. torllllllation indicates the direction ot the
relationships. but the magnitude ot the various relationships are not
known.

A rise in OC (ceteris paribus) would lower ER•• and a lowering

in OC would riae

Eft..

A rise in RCD (ceteris paribus) would raise ER••
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and a lowering of ECD would lower

Ea..

with respect to OC and KCD is not known.

However, the elasticity of Ea·
.Also (12) does not say an;v

thing about the form (i.e•• linear or non-linear)

ot the Ea· function.

Both the form of the functions and the elasticity coefficients of the
variables are matters to be solved by empirical investigation.
This demand for excess reserve formulation is at the base of
banking systelll reserve lIlS.lUIIgement behanor, and it rests squarely on

the assumption that reserves are managed with the intention of
mising losses from holding excess reserves.

~

A factor common to both

arguments explaining ER. is the existence of uncertainty. 20
tainty complicates the problem of reserve management.

Uncer

It makes banks

balance the gain trom use of reserves against the unforeseeable possi
bility that they ma;y incur a reserve deficiency: o.o..st.
ibe two arguments in the ER. formulation can be used to demonstrate
the two hypotheses set forth to explain the large volumes of excess
reserves during the 1930 1 s.

The liquidity trap hypothesis says a

low OC was responsible for the high ER..

The shitt-1n-liquidity

preference hypothesis says a high ECD (and in particular, a negative

Mt

and high Sf), is the proper explanation of the large excess reserves. 21

20 "With complete certainty no excess reserves would be held,lI ~.
p. 616. This reasoning assumes zero rate of return of ER. Kareken
presents a model in which ER* is determined by the rate of return on
reserves and loans, and the rate paid on deponts. John H. Kareken.
"Comerc1al Banks and the SUpply of Money." . Federal Reserve Bulletin,
October, 1967. p. 1699. Tobin suggests the payment-of interest on
exoess reserves -to make the opportunity cost holding excess reserves
controllable according to Central Banic discretion. James Tobin, "Toward
Improrlng the Efficiency of the Monetary Mechanism, II Review E! Economics
.e9. .-st.-&....t..i;;;;.st.-i...c;,,;;.s, August, 1960, p. 276.
21Horrison, Ope cit., explores this alternative empirically and
gives reasons for the plausibility of a shift in liquidity preference.
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What determ1riants of Ea. have not been

explicit~

included?

The

tollowing factors could certainl.y influence the demand for excess
res.rves, but they do not show up explicitly in the above Ea. function.
1.

The deposit mix.

2.

The earning asset mix.

).

Th. economic and geographicaldiversitication ot depositors.

4.

The size ot the bank.

5.

The bank's desire to accommodate customer loan demand.

Th. above Ea. function does account for these factors implicitly.
That is. their influence is reflected in the explicit arguments of
the function.
in

S:r

and Kg.

For example, the deposit mix would reflect itself
Diversification of depositors would also show up

througb. . expected, r~flow.

Th..... faotor&·h~thftr impact on

Ea· via the expliCit variables in (12).

Since OC and EeD are hard

to quantify tor ellpirica1 work, directly observable factors such as
deposit mix and bank size might be used to approximate the main
arguments in the Ea. function.
ll.

THE SUPPLY OF ER TO THE BANKING SYSTEM

The previous section developed the arguments in the demand

tor excess reserves.
ER

The actual stock of excess reserves is:

= TR - RR

fR (total reser.ves supplied to the banking system) is formulated
elsowhere in this paper.

Given the total deposits subject to

reserve requirements and the legal reserve ratio, RR at any time is

2,3

known. 22 The actual &IIlount of excess reserves available to the
banking system is jointl3' deterad.ned by banking system required

reserves and central bank: suppl3' ot reserves to the banking system.
III.

HEED FOR RESERVE ADJUSTMENT AND METHODS OF ADJUSTMENT

Ddsequilibrium between the actual stock of excess reserves and
the desired stock of excess reserves is the condition needed for
primar,y reserve adjustment.

in motion.

Ea.

I:

It sets the reserve adjustment process

The need tor reserve adjustment can be shown as:
ER

If ER is greater than ER•• the banking system will be attempting to

lower ER by' increasing their holdings of E1.
b&nk~M

system..1ncreasu itsbold:2..:cg.-. ot.

and a rise in RR reduces ER toward ER..

Ett

To the extent the
deposits are-sp&flEieci

If· ER is less than ER., the

banking s,ystem will be trying to increase ER by sell1ng

extent they sell
so are RR.

E1

Et.

To the

to the non-bank sector deposits are lowered and

TIns raises ER toward ER*.

In addition to this stock disequilibrium, there is a second
demension to the primary reserve adjustment process.

This is the

relationship of the distance between desired excess reserves and
actual excess reserves, (Ea. - ER). to the bank's effort to restore
equality between Ea. and ER.23 The asswnption is that the desired
22 Eecause' of the changes in reserve computation (referred to in
footnote 15), RR and the currency portion of TR are known at the begin
ning or the reserve period. This makes ER easier to estimate and their
actual value known sooner than before.

OPe

2,3 This aspect ot bank behavior is sldl.l.tully sbown by .Meigs,
cit., espec1aJ.ly pp. 49-53.
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rates at which banks approach a new equilibrium. is an increasing
tIlnction of the spread between ER. and ER:

dERb
CIt

= J (ER· - ml)

The subscript b denotes that this is a change in ER at the initiative
of the banking system.

The turther banks are out of equilibrium with

respect to their excess reserve positions, the greater will be their
etforts to equate ER. and ER.

Thus. for any given excess reserve dis

equilibrium, say (ER. - ERo )' there will be a rate at which banks are
tr;ving to change th.eir actUal. holdings of ER. ( d:nl'); and this inc
reases the greater (ER. - ER).

It can be seen that the greater

m. -

Ea,

the greater the use of available methods of adjustment by the banking
system.

That is. the greater will the banking system participate as

a net supplier or net demander of

E1

assets.

Two _thods of adjustment will be used for ana.lyzing the effects

ot primary reserve disequilibrium on the money market and on the stock
of primary reserves available to the banking system..
the sale or purchase of
and sale

Et

in the money market.

The first is

The.. include purchase

ot Federal funds, purchase and sale of short-term Treasury

securities, etc.

The second is a change in the level of borrowing from.

the Federal Reserve Banks.

The first method would have an impact on

rates in the money market, whereas the second would change the stock

ot primary reserves available to the

banking system.

A fiDal aspect of the reserve adjustment process is the influence

ot Federal Reserve open market sales and purchases on the banks· attempt
to achieve equilibrium in ER* and Eft.

For &D7 given d~, open

lIl4rket operations can be changing the actual Eft by a like amount in
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the opposite direction, and Federal Reserve policy would be just
otfsetting the banking system attempts to reconcile Ea. and ER.24
dERJ,
Federal Reserve Policy actions will be denoted dERF
IH.
If' (IE"'" , actual
Eft w:lll not change and bank influence on the money market will be negated
by Federal Reserve Policy.

Thererore, to observe the influence or

banks on the money ma.rket, the influence or the Federal ReMrve must
be held constant.

Thi. chapter has described the primar,y reserve adjustcent process.

Berore determining how this adjustment process arrects rates in the
money market and how central bank lending can influence these errect.
on the money market, the determinants or the actual volume or borrowing
trom the central bank must be examined.

24 Meigs, op. cit., r.rers to this as a secondary equilibrium.
He uses this concep~ show that ir a constant rre6 reserve position
is a secondary equilibrium, the Federal Reserve is not holding its
influence constant.

CHAPTER V
THE DETERMINANTS OF BORRaNED RESERVES

Most theoretical work on the role of central bank lending in the
monetary process assumes that the amount of reserves available to member
banks at the discount window is perfectly elastic at the prevailing
discount rate.

This has been directly stated by Dewald:

"Though

each Reserve Bank administers discounting as it interprets the governing
regulation. the fact is that borrowers are almost
with no question asked.,,25

alw~s

accommodated

Also, !1.onhallon and Parthemos, both officers

at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, state:

" ••• Reserve Bank admin

istration of the discount window seldom if ever involves any outright
refusals of accommodations to particular applicants ••• Hence it is
reasonable to consider that the supply of discount accommodation at
any

time is perfectly elastic at th~ going discount rate ••• ,,26 This

idea of perfectly elastic supply of reserves at the discount window
is also implied by studies which approach the determinates of member
banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve solely by analyzing the demand
function for such borrowing.27
25 William G. Dewald,

.2E:...2lli..

p. 142.

26 Jimmie R. Monhollon and James Parthemos, "Administering of
the Discount FUnction: A Comment~ National Banking Review (September,
1966). p. 92.

'l:l Murr~ E. Polakoff, "Reluctance Elasticity t least Cost and
Member-Bank Borrowing," The Journa.l of Finance (Ha.rch, 1960), '0. 1;
stephan M. Go1dfeld and EdWard J. K'a.ne. "The Determinants of M~mber
Bank Borrowing: .An Economic Study", Journal of Finance (September, 1966)
p.~.
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Federal Reserve Regulation and Statute interpretation regarding
the proper use of borrowing, including the forward to Regulation A
made effective in 1955. 28 and the present Committee Report, should
point up the possibility of supply conditions which are not perfectly
elastic at the discount rate.

SUch

supp~

conditions could

formidable role in determining. the amount of borrowing at

pl~

~

a

time.

It is the purpose of this section to show that the amount of borrowing
from the Federal Reserve is simultaneously set by both the demand
fUnction for borrowing (a behavioral pattern on the part of banks)
and the supply conditions at the discount window (set by the Federal
Reserve Banks as monopoly suppliers).

This will be done by separating

the influences on borrowing which come from the demand,function from
tboae... which are· derived from supply coruU:tion8-'.

Too often the-- supply

conditions which have nothing to do with member banks' demand function
are used as arguments in the demand fUnction for borrowing.29 It is
ver,y important that the influences from the supply side be kept separate
from those on the demand side i f the effect of a change in supply con
d1tions is to be properly assessed.

For example, the discount mechanism

changes proposed in the Committee Report are changes in supply conditions.
There is no reason to believe that they will in any way change the demand
function for borrowing on the part of banks.

However, the new supply

conditions may very well change the quantity of borrowed reserves
28 "Regulation A: Advances and Discounts by Federal Reserve Banks, 11
Federal Reserve Bulletin (January, 1955). pp. 8-14.
29 O:le example is the following by Honhollon and Partbemos,
..2E!.,ill,:., p. 92: "••• discount administration affects the quantity
of borrowing through its effects on the demand for such accommodation.. "
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demanded at any given time.

The supply conditions for reserves at the

discount window will be developed tirst.
I.

THE SUPPLY OF BORRONED RESERVES

Can an aggregate supply function tor reserves at the discount
window be postulated from the proposa.ls in the Committee Report?

Before attempting to formulate supply conditions, the present guide..
lines for administering the discount window need to be examined
briefly.
There are two ways by .which the Federal Reserve can influence the
volume ot borrowing at the discount window.
of the discount rate.

One is by manipulation

The other is the way in which the Federal Reserve

'BItrdts- define condit±ons or- eligibility.

rus definition

or eligibility

for member bank borrowing is usually referred to as the administration

ot the discount function. 30 Thus, tor

any given discount rate, supply

conditions at the discount window are determined by the administration

ot the discount function.

Regulation A, which gives broad guidelines

tor discount administration, provi.des that "the continuous use of
Federal Reserve Credit by a member bank over a considerable period of
time is not regarded as appropriate. ,,31

This can presumably be turned

30 David L. Lapkin and Ralph W'. prouts, "The Administration ot
the Discount Window, II National Banki!!! Review (December, 1965),
p. 179.
31 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Advan~es
Discounts ~ Fede~ Reserve Banks, ReKR1ation !., p. 1, Federal
Reserve Bulletin (JaJ'luary,1955j, p. 15.

~
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around and couched in supply terms by saying that continuous lending
to a single member bank b,y a Federal Reserve Bank is not considered

appropriate.

The 1955 forward to Regulation A gives some specific

cases of appropriate and inappropriate lending by the central bank.
The appropriate reasons for lending are to assist a bank in:

(1 )

unexpected temporary need of funds, (2) seasonal needs of funds which
cannot reasonabl.Y be met trom the banks own resources, and (3) unusual
or emergency situations.

Inappropriate lending includes:

(1) lending

to a single bank on a continuous basis, (2) lending to a bank so that
it can earn a rate differential, (3) lending to a bank so that it can
obtain a tax advantage,32 and (4) lending to facilitate speculation.))
The criterion of continuous borrowing has emerged as the most practical
i.l,lidellne for admin1.stering. the discount., window..

Guidelines· in the·

form of collateral eligibility requirements. which were supposed to
restrict central bank lending to productive uses fell into disuse after
the fallacies of the real-bills doctrine were exposed. 34 other criteria
)2 This apparently refers to a situation which lasted from 1951
to 1954 under which banks could reduce their liability on the excess
profits tax by borrOwing from the Federal Reserve. SUch borrowing
was included in the capital base against which actual profits were
compared to get the profit percentage. The smaller the percentage,
the lower the excess profits tax.

33 "Forward to Regulation A,"
1955), pp. 8-14.

Federal Reserve Bulletin (January,

34 George W. McKinney, The Federal Reserve Discount Window (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 19bO). See Chapter 6 for an
an~sis of the rise and fall of the eligibility requirements concept.
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tor discount administration (i.e., those listed under the appropriate
and inappropriate uses of borrowing) are almost impossible to determine.

For example, lending to a bank for a use which is not speculative may
tree other funds of the bank for speculative use.
ible to determine when making the loan.

This would be imposs

Apart from the practical

problems of the other criteria for discount

~~stration,

a basic

reason for using the continuity criterion is that appropriate situations

tor central bank lending can be readily defined in terms of the length
ot time a bank has been in.continuous dept to the Federal Reserve.
Barring the extreme circumstances of an emergency" the central bank
. i5 only to lend to a bank on a short-term and seasonal basis to help
meet temporary needs for funds.

Whether or not the use of borrowing

. was tor temsoorU':Y'need'S" could be adjudged on the basis of the continuous
nature of the borrowing.

Federal Reserve lending Cor a continuous period

oC time could be used as evidence that the borrowed. reserves are not

being used for temporary short-run purposes.
Although the extent of continuity in lending to a single bank
has emerged as criterion for administering the discount function, the
vagueness of the work flcontinuous" has remained a problem.

Different

interpretations can result in differences in discount administration
among the twelve Federal Reserve banks35 and over time.

The proposals

contained in the Committee Report are aimed at specifying (and quantify
ing) the meaning of the continuous borrowing criterion of discount

administration.

Three different situations for appropriate central

35 This possibility is the subject of the

Lapkin and Pfouts article
They conclude: "The faetual evidence is not compatible•••
with uniform administration of the discount function, II p. 186.

~

Eh

f
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bank lending are outlined.

These are lending to a bank for short-term

adjustment need, lending for seasonal accommodation, and lending for
emergency assistance.

The last two situations will not be included

in the following analysis on the grounds that to the extent such lending

situations may arise, they will be a nominal amount in relation to
total central bank lending.

Also, their behavior can be expected to be

constrained by the same specific criteria as central bank lending for
short-term needs, although the aotual outer limits in emergenoies and
seasonal lending would be larger.
ijv tar the most important feature of the Committee Report for

shaping central bank lending oonditions is the "basic borrowing
prl.vilege, tI which is meant to tultill the short-term needs of a bank.
This. concept sata, spe.ci.£ic.. l1mits on the &mQunt

can borrowtrolll Fed. per unit of time.

ot reserv&& a- ba.nki

In effect it gives specific

meaning to the "oontinuous borrowing" criterion of discount adminis
tration.

In devising a general definition of continuous borrowing.

two questions arise:
concern?

(1)

What is the appropriate time unit of

(2) What is the critical duration beyond whioh borrowing

becomes continuous?J6

The Committee Report takes a reserve period

(now one week) as the proper time unit for expressing a state of borrow
ing.

Since required reserves are speoified in average of daily

balanoes, borrowing at any time during a single reserve period is
essentially

par~

of the same operation.

The critical number of reserve periods beyond which borrowing

36
System:

Jack L. Cooper. "Continuous Borrowir.g From the Federal Reserve
Some Empirical F.vidence,1t Journal of Finance (Maroh, 19(9), p. JJ.
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becomes continuous is set at half thE;) reserve periods out of a siX
month period.

Thus, the proposal wants the base period (half of

which can be made up ot reserve periods that contain borrowing) to
be six months in length.

In setting these limits. the Committee's

objective was to fulfill the
individual banks.

short~term

adjustment needs of the

In the words of the Committee Report:

"The recommended operational objective is for
temporary credit accommodation to be extended
over a long enough period of time to cushion
short.term fluctuations and permit orderlY ad.
justment to longer-term movements but not for
so long as to invite procrastination in the
making ot needed adjustments by individual
borrowing banks or to delay unduly the response
ot the banking system to a change in general
monetary policy,n3?
In addition to the time limit which detines contiriuous borrow
ing, the Committee Report sets dollar limits tha.t the Reserve bank

will lend to a member as long as the limits of continuous lending

have not been violated.

The limits tor each bank are to be based

on the banks capital and surp1us--the relative amount of basic
borrowing privilege declining as capital and surplus become larger
(i.e., the limit would be
and surplus;

10-20~

20-40~

the first $1 million ot capital

ot amounts between $1 million and $10 million,

and 10;£ of ca.pita1 and surplus in excess ot $10 million).

Again,

these tigures are picked because they are thought to be large enough
to meet the short-term adjustment needs ot individual banks.
Whether or not these quantitative limits on the continuity and
absolute amount ot lending to a single bank are too large or too small
37 ••• :Report of a System Committee, .2E,•

.ill.,

p. 8.

))
is not the problem. here.

The question is, how do these kinds of

881£

imposed central bank lending restraints aftect the aggregate supplY
conditions for primar,y reserves at the discount window?

Reserves

available to the individual bank at the discount window are limited
from the supplY side mainlY by the amount the central bank has already
lent to the individual bank under consideration.)8 That is, borrowed
reserves supplied to a single bank are a decreasing function of the
number of reserve periods the bank has already been in debt to the
Federal Reserve:

P1 == f

(~

~

of last 26 reserve p&riods in debt)

••• <SO

Onder present proposals, borrowed reserves would be supplied until
theL bank. had borrowed in thirteen of the-laat twenty-sixperiods.

r~

Aftel" this, the supply of reserves at the discount window

would be cut off.
The need is to convert this into a supply relationship which makes
the reserves supplied at the discount window a function of their
effective cost.

To do this. an important assumption must be made,

namelY that discount administration as described above causes the
effective cost of borrowed reserves to rise as more reserves are
supplied to the bank at the discount window.

This assumption rt.JB.Y be

justified by the notion that the more a bank borrows

tod~,

the less

it will be allowed to borrow in the future; lower borrowing power
_ )8 The withdrawal of a borrowing request is interpreted as a
restraint from the supplY side when it is occasioned by a flat re
fusal to lend by the central bank, or when the bank is persuaded
not to make the request. by the central bank.
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in the future may require the bank to hold larger excess reserves in

the future (which involves a direct cost) than would otherwise be the
case. 39 Such a supply function for a single bank could be shown as
rollews:

R;

=F(rd + c)

RI = Reserves

supplied to an individual bank at the discount

window.

rd = Discount rate.
c

= Cost factor which increases as the percent of the last
26 reserve periods in debt increases toward 50%. This
is a cost factor which increases as future borrowing
potential decreases.

This function says that if a ballk is willing to pay a higher effective
cost tor borrowed reserves, it can obtain more reserves at the discount
t4.ndow•.

The relationship is derived directly from the supply conditions
proposed for the discount window.

These supply conditions raise the

effective cost of borrowed reserves to a bank as the frequenC,Y of
recent borrowing increases because they lower a bank's future borrow
ing potential and this, in turn, raises the amount of future excess
reserves a bank will need relative to the amount they would need
had their future borrowing capabilities remained unchanged.

Such

a rise in the ne8d for excess reserves in the future increases the
effective cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve.
As an extreme example suppose a bank has borrowed from the Federal

39 William Poole, "Commercial Bank Reserve Management in a
stochastic Model: Implications for Monetary PoliC,Y", Journal 2!.
Finance (December, 19(8), p. 785.

3.5
Reserve in 12 of the last 26 reserve periods (weeks).

If it borrows

in the present reserve period it cannot borrow in the following
reserve period.

~

borrowing in the present reserve period the

bank is creating the need for greater excess reserves next week.

This is a cost of borrowing during the present reserve period.

The

assumption is that if a bank has no discounting capabilities it is
going to hold greater excess reserves than if it has the capability
to borrow from Fed.
raise f'uture ER*?

Why would smaller f'uture discounting capabilities
~ure

Lower

discounting potential would raise the

expected cost of a reserve deficiency in two ways.

First lower f'uture

borrowing capabilities would restrict the means of reserve adjustment
to market instruments.

0£.. addus:tment. is. more

The penalty cost, n, tor market instruments
unce~_.

other. thing.s., equaJ., a ris. in

URCEtF

ta1nty regarding n would raise the expected cost of a reserve deficienqy.
Second, if the discount rate were below the rates on market instru
ments of adjustment, lower f'uture borrowing capabilities would raise
the cost per dollar of f'uture reserve deficiencies.
There is a problem in generalizing the supply function (~).
In the case of the single bank, it can be seen that an increase in

borrowing from the Federal Reserve would mena a higher effective cost
to the bank becanse of lower f'uture borrowing capability and greater
need for excess reserves.

But, in the f'uture, increased lending by

Fed. does not have to mean increased effective cost of borrowed re
serves to all banks.

For banks who have not as yet used the discount

window (say t in the last six months) t there is no increase in the
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effective cost of borrowed reserves.

Thus, an increase in the supply

of borrowed reserves to the banking system does not mean an increase
in effective cost to all banks-only to banks that are increas_ing their

borrowings.

But, a higher volume of borrowing does mean a rise in the

average effective cost of obtaining funds at the discount window.
Whether an increase in system borrowing comes from a bank that has not
previously borrowed (say, for 15ix months) or from a bank that has a
recent borrowing record, their effective cost of borrowing has increased
and this raises the average effective cost for all banks as a result
of the increase in supply of reserves at the discount window.

It is

possible that a bank with a low effective cost of borrowing would borrow
from the Federal Reserve and lend Federal funds to the bank which has
Su.ch

tendencies would work to equalize the effective cost of borrowing from
the Federal Reserve among all banks.

Therefore, the supply of borrowed

primary reserves to the banking s.ystem is seen as a function under which
the Federal Reserve b,y its discount administration practices can force
an increase in effective cost of borrowing as more borrowed reserves
are supplied.

The Quantity of borrowed reserves supplied to the bank

ing system is an increasing function of the average effective dost

of borrowing.

~

= F(CB);

~

= the average effective cost of borrowing
for the banking system.

This supply function together with the demand function for
borrowed reserves determines the actual behavior of borrowed reserves.
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II.

THE

DElI.A.~D

FUNCTION FOR BORROWED REStt-:RVES

The demand for borrowed reserves has received more attention as
a determinant of borrowing behavior than have

supp~

conditions.

is probably because of the key role assigned to it by
of central banking.

ear~

This

theories

In Riefler1s reserve position theor.y of monetary

control, the borrowed reserves demand function is the avenue by which
4O
open market operations influence commercial bank behavior.
He
argued that the demand for borrowed reserves was a stable function of
the banking s,ystems total reserves, regardless of profit opportunities
for borrowing.

Bank behavior couJ.d be influenced by changing the

actual reserve position of banks, ~, from their desired reserve position
: .•

BR is borrowed re serves of the banking system, and TR is total

reserves.

The Federal Reserve could raise

BR

~by

selling securities

in the open market, since banks would be forced at first to borrow

to restore reserves lost through open market operations.

With

ER

~

greater than~, banks would restrict lending so they could reduce
their borrowed reserves to the desired level.

In other words, open

market operations had the affect of changing the actual level of
borrowings, and the lending behavior of member banks is closely linked
to the amount of their indebtedness to the central bank.

The proof

of this link was said to be the close relation shown by the volume
of borrowing and market interest rates.

This reserve position doctrine

40 Winfield W. Riefler, Money Rates and Money Markets in the
United states (New York: Harper and Bros., 1930).

)8
of monetary control was given additional support by W. R. Burgess41
and later formed the foundation of the free reserve conception of
42
the monetar,y prooess.
What is of interest here is the particular demand funotion for
borrowed reserves which is of critical importance to the reserve
position theory.

A vital link in reserve position theory was the so

called tradition against borrowing on the part of oommercial banks.
This was founded on experienoe with finanoial oonditions which
existed prior to the Federal Reserve S,ystem.

In early finanoial

panios, a bank that depended heavily on borrowing would see its funds

dr.Y up and be the first to fail.

Also. the existenoe of borrowing

became generally regarded as a oonfession of weakened finanoial
condition and poor management. 43 The tradition ~st borr..ow:ing. was.
felt to be so strong that banks were also reluotant to borrow from the
Federal Reserve.

This reluotanoe to borrow was believed to be the dom.

inant factor in the borrowed-reserve demand funotion.

It is a basic

tenent in reserve position theory that the amount of borrowed reserves
demanded is a stable function of total reserves beoause of this relue
tanoe motive in the deoision to borrow.

That is. banks will borrow

only when they are for oed into it by a "need" and will try to reduoe
41 W. R. Burgess, The Reserve Banks and the Money Market. rev.
ad. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1936). - 
42 Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, The Federal Reserve's
Attachment ~ the ~ Reserve Concept: A "§'taff Analy;sis. U. S.
House of Representatives Banking ~,d Currenoy Committee (Washington,
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Offioe, 1964).
"
4) Murray F.. Polakoff f uFederal Reserve Disoount Policy and
Its Critios," Banking and Honetary ~udies, ed. Deane Carson
(Homewood, Illinois, 1963), p. 193.
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their level of borrowing as soon as possible.

Thus, a demand function

based on reluctance was a necessary link in the reserve position theory
of monetary control.
Today, when bank panics are much less a factor. the reluctance
motive is still regarded by many as the dominant force behind the
demand function for borrowed reserves.

The reason for this is a body

ot empirical work which shows a poor relationship between the spread
of the market rates and the discount rate, and the actual quantity
of borrowed reserves.

Since an increase in the spread between market

rates over the discount rate would mean greater profit incentive to
borrow, a lack of actual increase in borrowing under these circumstances
is interpreted to mean the reluctance mo:tive in the borrowed reserve
fl;u:).c:U.on

is the dominant one-.

ProfEtssor Polakoff has-.-formalizM a

reluctance theory of the demand function for borrowed reserves. 44
The marginal rate of disutility from being in debt to the Federal
Reserve rises at an increasing rate as the amount of debt increases.
Batt at the same time. the marginal utility trom profit is only raising

at a constant rate as borl'owing increases.

For any profit spread

between market rates and the discount rate there would be an amount
of borrowing which, if increased, would increase disutility greater
than it would increase profit.

The greater the profit spread, the

greater this critical amount of borrowing.

But Professor Polakoff

believes that at relatively low amounts of borrowing disutility from
borrowing is increasing at such a rapid rate that an increase in the
44 Murray E. Polakoff, ItReluctance Elasticity, Least Cost, and
Member Bank Borrowing," Journal of Finance, (March, 1960), p. 1.
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profit spread would raise borrowing only ani insignifioant amount or
none at all.

His evidence supporting this reluctanoe theorum is pre

. sented in the form of a group of scatter diagrams wherein the volume
of system borrowed reserves is plotted against the profit spread
between the Treasury Bill rate

~d

the disoount rate.

The observations

show a fl&ttening out of total borrowing as profit spreads inorease
and even in some cases, a deoline in borrowing.

Not withstanding the evidenoe that the quantity of borrowed
reserves demanded is not

olose~

related to the profit spread between

the market and disoount rate,45 it is the intention of this section
to show a demand fUnotion for borrowed reserves which is based
on the profit motive.

sole~

It should be remembered that the demand fUnotion

is- only one-- determinant of the aotual level of borrowing, and that the

profit motive is aooepted as the driving foroe in all other oommeroial
bank behavior.

Why should the theoretioal demand funotion for borrowed

reserves be any different? The partioular phenomenon in the behavior
of historiea1 levels of borrowing which has been attributed to reluot..
&noe on the part of banks, is also oonsistent with a model based on the
assumption of a profit motive demand funotion and a supply funotion
of the type previously desoribed.

If it were not for the peculiar

supply oonditions faoing banks, their actual borrowing behavior would
be free to refleot the profit motive of their demand function.

45 It should be noted that evidenoe has been presented both for
and against a profit theory of borrOwing from the Federal Reserve.
See the work of R. C. Turner. Member Bank Borrow;ns (Columbus, Ohio:
Ohio state University Press, 1938). ---
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To the extent reluctance influences the demand function for
borrowed reserves, it does so through the profit motive.

A bankls

reluctance· to depend on borrowing as a source of funds-because such
sources may not always be available and may cause future operating
difficu1ties--e&n be attributed to the bank's desire to MaXimi2e
long.run profits.

Also. reluctance to be indebted to Fed. because

such is felt to be admission of poor management is based on the desire
to maximize long-run profits.

This form. of reluctance should not

be confused with reluctance in borrowing behavior which is fostered
by central bank supply conditions.

Demand behavior based on the first

form of reluctance is actually demand behavior based on the profit
motive.

An additional reason for basing the borrowed reserve demand

fwlotion on profit maKimizatiolt'behavi'Or is- the fact that banks today
are not reluctant to borrow in general--witness the growth of the
Federal FUnds market during recent years.

Also, short-term note issues

became popular sources of short-term funds in 1964 and lasted until

1966 when the Federal Reserve redefined deposits to include most short
term note issues for the purpose of Regulation D ("Reserves of Member
Banks") and Regulation Q (nPayment of Interest on Deposits II ).46

Long

term debt in the form of capital notes or debentures have been readily
used by commercial banks in reoent years. 47

Thus. when reluctance,

which comes from the demand side, is attributed to the profit motive.

46 Federal Register, March 29, 1966.

47 stanley Silverberg, "Bank Borrowing: An A.na.lysis of Recent
Elcperience." ~!'!tiona+ Ba.nkiE£ Review (December. 1964), p. 213.
During late 190) and 1964, banks had sold nearly $800 million in
capital notes or debentures (See Appendix p. 232).
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the demand function becomes a downward sloping relationship with respect
to the effective cost of borrowing from the Federal Reserve at aqy
given set of market rates of interest.

At constant market rates of

interest, the lover the effective cost of borrowing the greater the
profit incentive to borrov and the greater the quantity of borrowed
reserves demanded.

This effective cost figure would include the dis

count rate, and the assumed implicit costs of having to hold more ER
than would otherwise be the case, due to lower futUl·e borrowing poten
tial, and other administrative transaction costs involved.
~stem

borrowed reserve demand function for

~

The banking

given market rate of

interest is:

R~

=f

(CB)

CB

=effective cost of borrowed reserves.

The demand function for borrowed reS8!"V'8e. as shown in this
section, is based on profit maximization objectives.

This is in line

with other theoretioal formulation of bank behavior (e.g •• reserve
management theory).

Reluctance to borrow, which comes solely from

the demand side, has been treated as the result of the basic desire
to maximize profit.

While the actual behavior of borrowed reserves

JIJI1Y show "reluctance behavior, n this is the result of both the demand

function and supply conditions.

This should in no

w~

be taken as a

description of the theoretical demand function for the banking s.ystem.
The actual shape of this borrowing demand function is not known.
~

a directional relationship

ship is postulated.

~ld

the factors affecting this relation

4.3
nI.

THE BEHAVIOR OF BORRGJED RESERVES

The two previous sections have developed the theoretical
and demand functions for borrowed reserves.

The

supp~

supp~

of borrowed

reserves was shown as an increasing function of their effective cost
to the banking system at a- given point in time with all other factors
that influence ~ held constant.

The demand for borrowed reserves

was shown as a decreasing function of the effective cost at a given
point 1."1 time with all other factors held constant.

In this static

analysis, the actual volume of borrowed reserves and their effective
cost are simultaneously determined.

It is now necessary to relax

this static analysis and examine the sources of c...i.anges in borrowed
reserves over time.

A change in the actual quantity of borrowed re

serves demanded would be caused either b,y a shift in the demand function
or in the supply function, or both.

Such shifts occur because the

factors held constant in static analysis are allowed to vary.
Shifts in the supply function for borrowed reserves would come
about by a change in the discount rate or by a change in the method
or administering the discount window.

To the extent the discount

window is administered with uniformity over time, it would help
to stabilize the supply function for borrowed reserves.

If the

discount window is administered more freely and banks are allowed
to borrow for longer periods of time and greater amounts, then at
~

given volume of borrowing the effective cost would be lower

than at the previous method of discount administration.

An easing

of discount administration would shift the supply function out,
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and tightening would shift the supply function back.

Administration

ot the discount window is to be independant of monetary policy.48
It therefore should not be an important source of instability of the

supply function.

In fact, the quantitative standards proposed in the

O>mmittee Report should. reduce it as a source of shifts in the supply
function for borrowed reserves.
A change in the discount rate would. also cause a shift in the
supply function.

A rise in the discount rate would raise the effective

cost of borrowed reserves at ever,y level of borrowing, and, by itself,
would lower the actual quantity of borrowed reserves demanded.

A

lowering of the discount rate would shift the supply functioll out and
the amount of borrowed reserves demanded would. increase.

Thus, a

lowering of the d'S sconnt rate would, by itself, b& expeeted to ra-ise
the level of borrowing and vice versa.
A change in the actual quantity of borrowed reserves outstanding
could also come about as a result of a shift in the demand function
for borrowed reserves.

The most important shift would be that resulting

from changes in market rates of interest.

For each demand curve,

the market rate of interest is taken as given.

At a constant market

rate of return, a lowering of the effective cost of borrowed reserves

will increase the quantity demanded because of the greater profit
opportunities in borrowing.
function a

d~~ard

This gives the borrowed, reserve demand

sloping shape.

It the market rate of return on

bank earning assets increases, a greater quantity of borrowed reserves

- 48 'Professor Whittlesey made this point in his discussion of con
ceptions regarding discount administration. C. R. Whi.tlesey t "Credit
Policy of the Discount Window,l1 Quarterly Journal 2.! F.conomics(Y.ay, 1959)
p. 207.
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Alternative~,

would be demanded at each level of their effective cost.

at each original level of borrowing. the profit incentive to borrow
would be widened causing

banks to increase their borrowing until the

effective cost rose high enough to eliminate the profit incentive to
borrow.

Thus, an increase in market rates would shift the demand

tunction upward and. by itself, increase the volume of borrowed reserves
outstanding.

ether things equal. a decrease in market rates of return

would lower the amount of borrowed reserves outstanding.
Using the theoretical demand and

supp~

tunction

previous~

developed in static analysis, the effect of a change in the discount
rate and in market rates of return on the volume of borrowed reserves
outstanding have been shown.

A rise in the discount would, by itself,

reduce borrowing and vice versa.

A ri.s.e . in the.. market interest rates

would raise borrowing, and lower market rates would lower borrowing.
Thus, movements in the same direction by these two variables have
opposite effects on actual borrowing behavior.

The effect of these

two rates on borrowed reserves can be put another way:

A rise in

market rates relative to the discount rate would increase borrowed
reserves.

A decline in market rates relative to the discount rate

would be expected to reduce borrowing.

Row much actual borrowing

responds to such rate movements depends on the elasticities of the
supply and demand tunctions.

The actual shapes of the

demand functions are not known.

~

supp~

and

directional relationships and

the factors affecting these relationships are postulated.

This, however,

is enough to suggest how actual borrowed reserves will behave during
the primar,y reserve adjustment process.

The effects of borrowing
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from the central bank on money market rates and on the supply of
reserves to the banking system will now be discussed.

CHAPTER VI
THE EFFECT OF CENTRAL BANK LENDING ON THE 'lVO OBJECTIVES
OF DISCOUNT REFORM
Up to now, this paper has developed theoretical tools for use

in understanding how member bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve
will affect rates in the money market and the supply of reserves to

the banking system.

First, a model of the primary reserve supply

process was developed and the conditions stated by which borrowed re.
serves will improve monetary control.
adjustment process was formulated.

Second, the primary reserve

In part three, the determinants

of borrowed reserveS',' wer...-sftOWll with sperial emphasis

otr

how market

rates of interest and the discount rate affect the quantity of borrow.
ed reserves demanded.

In this part, these tools will be used to

identif.y the probable effects of central bank lending on the two
objectives of discount reform.

To do this. the relation of the

reserve adjustment process to the money market must be developed.
From this, the effect of central bank lending on money market rates
can be seen.
I.

Also, implications for monetary control will be studied.

RELA.TIONSH]l) OF THE RESERVE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS TO THE MONEY lI.ARKET

Two concepts were developed in describing the reserve adjustment
process.

One is the need for banking system reserve adjustment signi

fied by disequilibrium between ER and ER*.

The other is the rate at

which the banking system is trying to correct differences in F.R and
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Ea..

The assumption is that the greater the difference between ER and

Ea., the faster banks are attempting to achieve equilibrium.

How do

these two factors in the reserve adjustment process affect the money
market?
In attempting to determine the effect of the banking s,ystem

reserve adjustment on the money market, we must assume in this analysis
that all other participants in the money market are holding their effects
constant.

This includes the Federal Reserve.

In such a controlled

experiment, any rate change in the market is a rate change caused by
bank adjustment.

In Chapter IV, the methods of banking primary reserve adjustments

vere grouped into two categories:

(1) changes in the amount of borrow

ing from the Federal Reserve, and (2) buying and selling earning monetary
assets (Ej,).

The former changes excess reserves (1m) by changing total

reserves (Ta), while the latter changes ER by changing required reserves
(RR).

Assuming no borrowing from the Federal Reserve (this assump

tion will be dropped later when the effect of central bank lending
on money market instability is considered), all methods of adjustment
can be combined into the demand for and

supp~

of one single

reserve adjustment instrument, and the market for this instrument is
called the money market.

Banks in the system having ER greater than

ER. have "surplus" excess reserves, and banks that have ER less than
ER. have "defi<::ient" excess reserves. 49

Any

"surplus" is expressed

49 This concept of "surplus" and "deficienttt excess reserves is
used by ~xnner and Meltzer to describe a condition of monetary
expansion or contraction. See Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer,
~ Alternative A~roach to ~ Monet~ Mechanism, U.S. House of
Representatives nking and Currency.Committee (washington D. C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964.)
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as a demand for the reserve adjustment instrument.
excess reserve position is expressed as a

supp~

A. "deficient"

of the reserve ad

justment instrument.
Can the money market rate (single adjustment instrument rate)

change because or individual bank adjustments: when the aggregate
Ea.

= 1m, (i. e.,

when the banking system is in equilibrium with respect

to the holding of excess reserves)?

The answer is no.

Some individual

banks will have "surplus" excess reserves and some will have "deficient"
excess reserves based on their individual ER. and ER relationships.
!:Ut, for all banks, "surplus" excess reserves will be zero.
aggregate ER.
supp~

= ER,

When

individual bank reserve deficiencies add to the

of this market in the same amount that individual reserve

surpluses add to the demand.
contributing to the

supp~

Bank reserve ad1ustments as a whole are

in the money market in the same amount as

they are contributing to the demand, and, therefore, primary reserve
adjustments have no effects on the rates in this market.
Instability in the money market can come from the bank reserve
adjustment process o~ if aggregate ER.

F ER.

When this is the case,

the bank reserve adjustment process is having a net effect one way or
the other on rates in this market.
ER, there is a net
would raise rates.

supp~

When aggregate ER. is greater than

increase of assets to this market.

This

Banks are net sellers of their reserve adjustment

assets to this .market in the attempt to build ER up to F.R*.

When

aggregate ER. is less than ER, ba."'lks will be net buyers in the market
in their attempt to lower ER to ER..
~o

They will be contributing more

demand in the market than they are contributing to supply, and the
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reserve adjustment factor will have a downward effect on rates in this
market.

Thus. instability in the money market rate which is caused

by banking system reserve adjustment must therefore be explained by
ditferences in

and Ea, and these differences must move in opposite

F~*

directions.
Before adding borrowing from the Federal Reserve as the second
method of adjustment, the implications of combining all market instru
ments of adjustment (i.e., Fed. Funds, Treasury Bills, etc.) into one
reserve adjustment instrument should be discussed.

Are there any com..

plications when the assumption of a single market reserve adjustment
instrument is dropped?

Suppose Federal Funds are used as a single

proxy for all market reserve adjustment instruments.

Then individual

bank "surplus" excess reserve positions would be shown as a supply of

Federal Funds, and a "deficient" excess reserve position would show
up as a demand for Federal Funds.

Now suppose Treasury Bills are

added as a reserve adjustment instrument.

A surplus could be reduced

by purchasing Bills or by selling Federal Funds.
one while others choose the other.

Some banks would use

This could result in a greater

a.ddition to supply than demand, or vice versa, for either one of these
instruments even though aggregate ER* = ER.

While aggregate ER* = ER.

a. net demand for one instrument could develop while a net supply devel
oped for the other.

The reserve adjustment process would, therefore,

be causeing rates on the two instruments of adjustment to move in oppo

site directions.

But, rates would not diverge far because banks with

"deficienciestl would use the least costly instrument, and banks with
"surpluses" would choose the higher rate instrument.

The result would
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be to drive rates on different market adjustment instruments together,
and when ER.

=ER.

they are not as a group changing over time.

Thus,

there seems to be no problem in treating all market instruments of
adjustment as one instrument (referred to as

Ei).

and as a single

alternative to borrowing from the Federal Reserve. during the reserve
adjustment process.

n.

THE EFFF;CT OF BORROWING FROM THE FEDERAL RESE..'lVE ON MONEY

MARKET RATES
The way in which banking

~stem

primary reserve adjustment can

affect the money market has been shown above.
equilibrium in ER and
by buying or selling

ER.. Attempts to
Et influence rates

There must be dis.

correct thi.s disequilibrium
in the money market.

To the

extent borrowing from the Federal Reserve is used instead of market
instruments of adjustment, the effects of banking

~stem

adjustment on the money market can be mitigated.

W1l1 borrowed reserves,

reserve

in fact, be expected to behave in a manner that woul.d mitigate money

market movements that are the result of primary reserve adjustment?
It. is the preliminary conclusion of this paper that they will.

When

there are tldeficient" excess reserves. the banking system is a net
demander of E1 assets.

This would tend to raise maney market rates.

The greater ER. is over ER, the faster banks will be trying to sell

11

and the greater will be their upward influence OR market rates per

unit time.

Now; borrowing from the Federal Reserve can be added as

a .method of adjustment, and it would be expected to behave in a manner
described in Chapter V.

If banks were at first in equilibrium with
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respect to borrowed reserves, a rise in market rates caused by a
"deficient" excess reserve position would increase borrowed reserves,
and this method of adjustment would reduce the net amount of

supplied to the money market for any given ER *>ER.

F~

assets

This would reduce

the change in market rates caused by primar.Y reserve adjustment.

The

assumption that borrowed reserves were in equilibrium in the first place
aeans the effective cost of borrowed reserves is equal to the market
rata of return and there is no incentive to increase borrowed reserves.
A "surplus" in the excess reserve position of banks would mean the
bank reserve adjustment process is having a downward influence in

money market rates.

To the extent borrowing from the Federal Reserve

1s reduced in response to the decline in market rates, ER would be
lowered toward ER. without net purchases of E:t. assets by the banking
system.

Therefore, the existence of borrowing from the Federal Reserve

as an alternative adjustment instrument to the purchase and sale of E1 ,
1s a mitigating factor on market rate movements caused by banking system
primary reserve adjustment.

This is because the greater the difference

between ER * and ER, the greater the change in borrowed reserves in a
direction which reduces the need to use
This use of

Et

as an instrument of adjustment.

E:t. in reserve adjustment is the proximate cause of money

market rate movements. 50
'!he above analysis has shown that borrowed reserve behavior would
be expected to lessen money market rate movement once disequilibrium

50 The analysis so far has assumed the discount rate to be con
stant. Borrowed reserves would behave in the same direction if market
rate changes were taken as changes relative to the discount rate.

S3
in ER and ER. started their movement in one direction or another.
Whether or not central bank lending will lessen the cause of bank
reserve adjustment pressure on money market rates is another question.
Instability in the money market has been previously defined as rapid
and directional changes in rates.

Thus, for bank reserve adjustment

to cause rate instability, the aggregate reserve position of banks
must be in disequilibrium in opposite directions over rel.8.tively short
periods of time.

This means ER must be greater than EHo*, and then

less than ER, etc., over time.

In this way, banks would shift from

net demanders of El to net suppliers of El and influence money market
rates in opposite directions.

To eliminate this cause of money market

instability. the behavior of borrowed reserves would have to reduce
the tendency of ER. and ER to shift ar.ound.

In other worda. it w.ould

have to reduce instability in the ER. and ER.
Federal Reserve lending practice must stabilize ER* b.y stabil
izing its two main arguments-OC and ECD.

The tendency of borrowed

reserves to mitigate rate movements once they are started is a factor
that would work to stabilize OC.

This is because lower fluctuation

in market rates lowers Sg and stabilizes r.

But, there is no apparent

reason to expect the postulated borrowed reserve behavior to affect
the ECD argument.

The effect of the borrowed reserve behavior on

actual excess reserves (ER) and. therefore, on money market rates
will be discussed below.
This section has applied the postulates on borrowed reserve
behavior with respect to market rates and the discount rate to the
reserve adjustment process.

It has shown how the banking S,Ystem
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reserve adjustment process influences money market rates.

Borrowed

reserve behavior was seen as a mitigating factor on such money market
rate movements.
the OC argument.

In doing this, it does tend to stabilize Ea* through
Instability in ER * and ER were shown to be the cause

of reserve-adjustment induced instability on money market rates.
Thus, there are reasons to believe the behavior of borrowed reserves
would tend to reduce instability in money market rates.
points to tendencies

on~.

The

ana~sis

The strength and magnitude of the relation

ships are not known.
III.

THE EFFEcr OF BORRC1t1ING FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE
ON MONETARY CONTROL

The conditions under which borrowed reserve behavior can improve
monetar,y control were given in Chapter III.

The

supp~

of reserves

to the banking system is:
Rs

=t

(S, B, X)

It B behaved in a

w~

to offset unwanted movements in the market

determined variables summarized in I, it would improve monetar,y con
trol.

It B behaves in a manner to offset changes in the controlled

variable S, it is diminishing monetary control.
to indicate that B would behave

different~

Is there anything

toward the controlled

variable S than the market determined variables in 11 The answer is
yes.

B would more likely behave in a manner to offset changes in the

controlled variable S than the market determined variables in X.

A

purchase in securities by the Federal Reserve (increase in S) is an
indication that it is Fed's policy to increase Ratend to lower markot rates.

This action would

According to the previously postulated
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relationship between market rates and borrowed reserves, this lower
market rate would decrease B, and this would offset part of the in
crease in S.

Likewise, a sale of securities by Fed would indicate

a poliqy of reducing Rs-

This sale would tend to raise market rates,

and this, in turn, would increase borrowing.

The rise in B would

offset at least part of the policy change in S.

This offsetting

direction that B would be likely to move in response to a change in S
would be known, but the magnitude would not.

This would depend on the

change in market rates for a given change in S, and the change in
B for a given change in market rates.
On the other hand. there is no apparent reason to think B would

act to offset unwanted changes in the market determined variables.
B would not be expected to automatically offset unwanted change in
the variables in X.

Therefore, in this analysis. the behavior of

borrowed reserves is seen as d1m1n1sbing the central bank control
over the supply of reserves to the banking system.

It does this by

weakening the link between the controlled variable S and the object
to be controlled-Rs •

Also, borrowed reserves would not be expected

to offset unwanted changes in the market determined variables of the
primary reserve supply model.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

This paper has attempted to clari.fy the issues and relationships

to be considered in understanding the effects of borrowed reserves
on the

supp~

of reserves to the banking system and on money market

ra.te stability.

These include the following:

1.

The relationship -of the reserve adjustment process to the
money market (Chapter VI).

2.

The relation of borrowed reserves outstanding to market rates
of' interest and the discount rate (Chapter V).

).

The relation of' borrowed reserves to policy directed open
market operations (Chapter VI).

The implications of the

~sis

for the two objectives of

discount ref'orm can be summarized as follows:
1.

Borrowed reserves are likely to behave in 8. manner to
mitigate money market rate movements which are caused
b,y primar,y reserve adjustment. The reasons for reserve
adjustment induced instability in money market rates-
instability in .the supply and demand for excess reserves
--may also be reduced by borrowed reserve behavior, how
ever central bank lending alone cannot be expected to
eliminate this cause of' money market instability.

2.

The an~sis also gave reasons to believe that borrowed
reserves behavior would deminish the central banks con
trol over the supp~ of reserves to the banking system.

The nature of' the relationships

under~

these conclusions

has been shown, but a test of their strength is an empirical task
which has yet to be undertaken.
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